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EVOLUTION IN PAPER MONEY IN UNITED STATES

By WILLIAM WATTS

FOLWELL*

story of paper money in America in colonial and revolutionary times is a tedious and pitiful one. The catalogue
of possible experiments seems to have been exhausted.
Some colonial paper issues were founded on revenues or
.property specifically pledged for their redemption, some on receivability for taxes and other public dues, some on the uncertain
basis of colonial or continental credit; some issues were declared
by law to be legal tender for private debts, some not.
In a few cases the issues 'were so moderate in amount and so
faithfully redeemed that no mischief followed, and the public
convenience was served. In most instances, however, the issues
were so extravagant and redemption so remote and uncertain,
that the miserable consequences had only the variety of degree
between slight depreciation and absolute worthlessness. Values
were unsettled, trade demoralized, labor defrauded, knavery was
rampant, gambling universal and beggary overtook those people least able to protect themselves. In one instance the people
rose in actual insurrection against the intolerable abuses of bad
money. Things were at their worst perhaps in the half dozen
years next preceding the convention of 1787. The regulation of
commerce between the states involving the establishment of a
uniform currency was one of the motives which moved the people to demand a revolution in the general government.
With such facts and experiences before them the members
of the "Grand Convention" attacked the currency problem. They
went about this business as statesmen rather than as lawyers.
Their minds were set upon establishing grand muniments for
liberty and the general welfare of a nation, not on the mere
HE

*President Emeritus, University of Minnesota.
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framing of a document. The brief and simple constitution, unincumbered by legal technicalities, is proof of the spirit and method
of the framers. The absence of ability and disposition to indulge
in legal finesse is shown in the circumstance that the convention
at one time (August 28) voted to forbid the states to pass ex
post facto laws for the purpose of preventing them from interfering with past civil contracts. It was not till the following day
that Dickinson announced his discovery that the terms "ex post
facto" had reference to criminal proceedings only. We are to
see what came, in one instance, of this noble simplicity.
There can be no question but that the controlling minds of
that convention supported by a large majority of the members
meant to do these things: (1) to place the currency under the
exclusive control of the national government; (2) to abolish all
forms of paper money and leave the metallic currency coined
under the authority of Congress the sole legal tender for all
debts public and private. The feebler efforts of the few dissentients went no further than to advocate reserving to the national
government the power to issue paper money in times of extreme
distress. The convention however undertook the task of abolishing paper money so long as the constitution left by them should
remain unamended.
The draft of a constitution reported on the 6th of August
following nearly the phraseology of the articles of confederation
contained among the powers to be confided to Congress the
clause:
"To borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United
States." On reaching the clause the convention voted (nine states
against two: New Jersey and Maryland) to.strike out the words
"and emit bills."
Now the phrase "to emit bills of credit" meant in that time
simply "to issue paper-money." In later days refinements unknown to the framers were devised by the lawyers and sanctioned by the courts. The convention meant by striking out the
words "and emit bills" to disenable the national government from
issuing paper money. A reading of the debate on the motion
of Gouverneur Morris to so strike out -will show that all those
members who spoke for the affirmative did- so on the ground that
there could then be no national paper money. All those who
opposed striking out did so, because they were not willing to
abolish paper money.
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Wilson of the ayes, rejoiced in the opportunity to "remove
the possibility of paper money." Mercer of the noes, was a
"friend of paper money" . . . and "was consequently opposed to a

prohibition of it altogether."
Luther Martin of Maryland in an address to the legislature
of his state, made to account for his leaving the convention before
its adjournment, gave, as one of his reasons, the intention of that
body to prohibit paper money-using the following language:
"A majority of the convention, being wise beyond every
event, and being willing to risque any political evil rather than admit the idea of a paper emission, in any possible case, refused to
trust this authority . . . and they erased that clause from the

system."
The historians and commentators agree to this simple and
obvious interpretation of the phrase "bills of credit," and such
was the doctrine of the Supreme Court in earlier days. In the
case of Craig v. Missauri' Chief Justice Marshall speaking for
the Court defined bills of credit to be "a paper medium intended to circulate between individuals and between government and
individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society."
This view is insisted upon because another has, at times, been
presented explainable only upon the assumption of disgraceful
insincerity and sophistication on the part of the framers. On
taking up the list of powers to be forbidaln to the states it was
observed that the draft contained no clause prohibiting states to
issue paper money.
The report by Madison 2 runs thus:
"Mr. Wilson and Mr. Sherman moved to insert, after the
words 'coin money' the words 'nor emit bills of credit, nor make
anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts,' thus
making these prohibitions absolute."
Mr. Gorham thought "an absolute prohibition of paper money
would rouse the most desperate opposition from its partisans."
Mr. Sherman thought this "a favorable crisis for crushing paper
money." The motion to insert prevailed, eight states to two on
emitting bills, unanimous vote on legal tender clause. Luther
Martin's testimony on this head is clear and emphatic :3
"As it was reported by the committee of detail, the states were
not only prohibited from emitting them [bills of credit] without
the consent of Congress; but the Convention was so smitten with
1(1830) 4 Pet. (U.S.) 410, 425, 7 L. Ed. 903.
2
See 5 Elliott, Debates 484.
"See Secret Debates 69.
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the paper money dread, that they insisted that prohibition should
be absolute."
The prohibition to the states of making any thing a legal tender besides gold and silver was intended to forbid the repetition
of such acts as making land and other property a tender, not as
commonly supposed to forbid their making paper money a tender
because that the convention were undertaking to abolish utterly.
In the state conventions for ratifying the new constitution the
references to the currency provisions are few. The general tenor
of them is that paper money whether of state or nation was abolished, and in some instances this was urged as a reason for rejecting the constitution. There is but a single exception. In the
convention of South Carolina Mr. Lowndes had inveighed against
the constitution because it put an entire stop to paper emissions.
Mr. Barnwell in reply said :'
"If to strike'off a paper medium becomes necessary, Congress
by the constitution, still have the right, and may exercise when
they think proper."
Having, as was believed, prohibited all forms of paper
money, and forbidden the states to make anything but metallic
money a tender for debts, there remained for the convention to
lodge in the hands of Congress the express power to "coin money,
and to regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins." The
monetary system was now complete. The currency was to be
national, metallic and -wholly under the control of Congress.
So much the convention did. There were some things they
did not do. First, they did not expressly forbid Congress to emit
bills of credit of any kind: Second, they did not forbid Congress
to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of
debts, private or public, either or both: Third, they did not declare gold and silver coins to be a tender in payment of debts, proceeding upon the apparent assumption that coined money must be
ex necessitate a tender without any express legislation: Fourth,
they did not forbid individuals and corporations to issue bills of
credit, under state supervision, or acquiescence. Whether propositions embodying any one of the prohibitions would have received approval must remain an open question. The hard money
majority were content with what they supposed they had put into
the constitution. Private and" corporate banking had up to that
time cut too small a figure to require serious attention. Hard
money they assumed must be legal tender and the doctrine of
4See 4 Elliott, Debates 289 and 294.

EVOLUTION IN PAPER MONEY IN UNITED STATES

565

strict construction acquiesced in by all, would place it out of the
power of Congress to perform acts not expressly authorized, including the emission of bills of credit and making anything but
gold and silver coin a legal tender for debts. The constitution
was ratified and the new government went peaceably into operation. The hard money secretary of the treasury was hardly
warm in his seat, however, before he drew up a report and December 13, 1790 transmitted it to Congress recommending the
establishment of a bank of the United States which should have
the power of issuing circulating notes receivable for all dues to
the United States.
In February 1791 Congress passed a bill to charter the bank
for twenty years and the document went to President Washington for his signature. Upon consulting the cabinet he found them
divided. Jefferson, Secretary of State, supported by Edmund
Randolph, Attorney-General, opposed the bill. Hamilt6n seconded by Knox of the War Department stood up vigorously for it.
The two opinions are characteristic of the men and the parties
they belonged to in later years. The Virginian, applying the principle of strict construction showed by an exhaustive process that
the constitution gave and could give Congress no power to incorporate a bank, whether express or implied.
The great New York financier, knowing as no one else could
know the need of the new government for ready morey and of a
lender who could be depended on in sudden emergencies-who in
short as treasurer "must have money" swept aside all legal and
technical objections with the broad assertion that although the
government did possess but a limited range of powers, that
within the range it was supreme or sovereign, and therefore entitled to do all the things necessary (in a reasonable sense of that
word) to put those powers, limited only in their range, into
beneficent exercise. After causing Madison to draft a veto message Washington signed the bill and the First United States Bank
came into being. It can not 'be doubted that the impending need
of ready money was the consideration which turned the scale.
For twenty years the bank served the government as a convenient fiscal agency for the transmission of revenue collections and
other funds. It loaned the treasury large sums in emergencies,
but not without a good interest. Its notes, receivable for' public
dues, had extensive circulation and were in general request. It is
somewhat strange that a measure meeting with so much opposition in its passage through the legislature, was not brought to
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judgment in the supreme court. Had it been there can be little
if any doubt that its constitutionality would have been negatived.
It was in the very next year after the establishment of the
bank (1792) that there began a great and remarkable development of private banking, the occasion of which would form the
subject of an interesting economical inquiry. In the twenty years
following more than eighty such banks were opened in the thirteen states. These banks issued circulating notes based on such an
amount of specie as the directors deemed prudent to keep in
their vaults. Not being legal tender, and circulating mostly near
home, and being acceptable to customers, nobody called their legality in question. The profits were large, and before the close
of the twenty years for which the bank, the First United States
Bank, was chartered, "banking" became a craze in most if not all
of the states.
When the question came up in Congress in the winter of 1811,
of renewing the charter of the United States Bank, the partisans
of state banking were able to defeat the measure and the institution expired by limitation. The state banking mania now raged
more violently than ever and the country was flooded with paper
emissions huge in bulk and correspondingly low in value. The
war of 1812 came upon the country in the midst of this deluge.
The government undertook to carry on the war by means of
loans secured by bonds then called stocks. Ten millions were borrowed in 1812 at par; twenty millions in 1813 at 13% and in the
following year fifteen millions more at 25%. Then it became
impossible to borrow any more. In August 1814 the banks suspended specie payments, their currency ceased to circulate, and
specie having been largely exported in consequence of the redundance of cheap paper money, the country was without money.
Already recourse had been had to interest-bearing treasury
notes of $100 and upwards, receivable for taxes and public dues.
Although fundable into United States bonds these notes suffered
great depreciation and were too large in denomination to serve
for currency. Congress accordingly at length authorized the issue
of "small treasury notes," in denominations of 3, 5, 10, 20 and 50
dollars and specifically voted not to make them legal tender. The
war coming soon after to a happy conclusion these small treasury
notes ,being fundable into 7% bonds disappeared from sight. These
notes were not made legal tender, but they were intended to serve
the purposes of paper money. We have here another instance of a
resort by the government to paper emissions, in a sudden emer-
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gency. The constitutionality of the second bank, vigorously
questioned in the legislature (as was that of the First Bank), was
brought to the arbitrament of the Supreme Court in 1819 in the
famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland.5 Chief Justice Marshall
announced it as the unanimous and decided opinion of the Court
that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States was a
law made in pursuance of the constitution, and was a part of the
supreme law of the land. The argument of the chief justice is in
essence that of Hamilton, of which he remarked that it exhausted
that side of the argument. To us it seems like an ingenious accommodation of the law to a state of facts, not foreseen by the
framers of the constitution. It unbarred the door through which
a long tandem of innovations has since been driven. In April 1816
the Second Bank of the United States was chartered by Congress
for twenty years, after a stormy debate, and a trial of several
bills one of which received the veto of President Madison. But
there was a general agreement that a bank of some kind was
indispensable. After some three years of hardship the Second
Bank entered upon a career of great prosperity and, it is claimed,
of usefulness. It is not necessary to the object of this paper to
relate the fortunes of this institution or its overthrow in 1836.
Congress refused to renew the charter but the bank continued
to exist till 1839 under a charter from the state of Pennsylvania.
A second state banking craze had come upon the country in
the last years of the second bank analogous to that which had accompanied the downfall of the first bank. The removal of the
government deposits from the United States Bank and its branches to selected state banks, stigmatized as the "pet banks," had the
effect to stimulate a process of inflation already in progress from
other causes. At no period of our history has there been such an
amount of wild and reckless financiering as in the closing years of
Jackson's second administration. Banks were multiplied beyond
all reason and their issues, based sometimes on worthless securities, reached to fabulous amounts. A panic struck in the winter
of 1837 and in May all the banks of the country suspended. Here
was another "sudden emergency," and a recurrence of the same
now time honored remedy, an emission of government paper.
From 1837 to 1844 treasury notes to the amount of forty-seven
millions were issued. They were in considerable variety, -as regards denomination, time and interest. The earlier issues because
bearing but a low rate of interest and being fundable, failed to
5(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316-437, 4 L. Ed. 579.
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serve the purpose of their creation, to serve as paper money.
Caleb Cushing denounced these notes as unconstitutional, being
virtually "bills of credit." One of the later emissions was in denominations of $50 bearing interest at the rate of one-thousandth
of one per cent.
A committee of Congress reported these notes as "bills of credit" issued in violation of the constitution. The tradition of the
fathers was still so strong in this second generation that statesmen still believed that the constitution forbade the emission of
paper money by government, state or national. The evasion of
,the principle by the device of a national bank and its issues had
however been legalized by the judiciary in the case of McCulloch
v. Maryland.6 Curiously the constitutionality of state bank paper
money had had to await the lapse of many years before it received
the sanction of the judiciary. In 1837 the case of Briscoe v. The
Bank of the Coin-monwealth of Kentucky had come on to .be
heard by the Supreme Court. The stock of this bank was wholly
owned by the state and the officers were virtually agents of the
state. Nevertheless the court by a majority held that the bank
was not the government, nor a branch of the government, that
the credit of the state was not pledged and that the bank was
suable; consequently its issues were not unlawful. In this case
the court amended the clear and simple definition by Chief Justice
Marshall of "bills of credit" given above.
"To constitute a bill of credit within the constitution it must be
issued by the state on the faith of the state, and be designed to
circulate as money."
Judge Story9 in his dissenting opinion held that the constitution, prohibits bills of credit not merely by a state but "by or in
behalf of a state, in whatever form."
We have in this decision another positive and considerable enlargement of the constitution. Issues of paper money by institutions authorized by state governments are lawful provided that
they cannot be made legal tender for private debts.
Without doubt the establishment of this doctrine as the supreme law of the land had much to do with diffusing and strengthening the state banking mania which culminated in 1837.
6(1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316-437, 4 L. Ed. 579.'
7(1937) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 257, 9 L. Ed. 709.
8
McLean, CJ. in Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Ky., (1837)
11 Pet. (U.S.) 257, 318, 9 L. Ed. 709.
9(1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 257, 348, 9 L. Ed. 709.
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We turn again to congressional action. In the course of the
Mexican war the revenue of the country having been reduced by
cutting down the tariff of 1842, recourse was again had to treasury
notes. There were various issues, among them one of one and
three quarter millions at one mill per cent per annum. This onethousandth of one per cent interest was enough to save the constitution which was still supposed to forbid the emission of bills
of credit. Again in 1857 the banks having suspended, the treasury
was forced to the issue of some fifty-three million of treasury
notes.
We come now to the period of the slaveholders' rebellion. In
the opening year the treasury was literally empty and the credit
of the United States had so fallen that when a five million
loan on one year treasury notes was offered, but ten per cent of
it ($500,000) was taken at 12% interest.
Two days after the disaster of Bull Run, President Lincoln called for five hundred thousand three-year volunteers, and summoned Congress to ineet in extra session on July 4. By that time
the war debt was ninety millions. In the next fiscal year it had
been run up to five hundred and twenty-four millions. On July
1, 1863 it stood at $1,120,000,000. As a matter of course Congress had to resort to its power to borrow money on the credit of
the United States. The first move was an issue of one hundred
forty millions of "seven-thirty treasury notes" and sixty millions of demand notes without interest; mere "due-bills" in nature.
Now notes not bearing interest payable on demand had in 1844
been deemed by Congress to be bills of credit under constitutional
ban. In August of 1861 the associated banks of New York rallied to the support of the government whose borrowing ability
appeared to be about exhausted-resolving most patriotically to
stand or fall with the national credit. These banks took one hundred millions of the seven-thirties, and agreed to take, and did
take up, the amount of one hundred fifty millions on condition
that the government should put out no other treasury notes or
bonds, except demand notes until February 1, 1862. On December 28, 1861 the banks everywhere suspended specie payment.
Here was indeed an emergency. The treasury empty, expenses
running up at the rate of thirty millions a month, the paymaster
general already in arrears to the army, credit greatly reduced,
the ability of the banks to loan exceedingly doubtful, some extraordinary means of borrowing money, or of getting money,
must be resorted to.
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The thirty-second Congress assembled on December 2, 1861,
and immediately addressed themselves to the financial problem.
The secretary of the treasury had caused a national bank bill to
be prepared, for the use of Congress. The suspension of the
banks rendered, or was thought to render, it impossible to await
the action of Congress, however expeditious, in discussing so elaborate and intricate a bill sure to meet with opposition. On
December 30, 1861 Mr. E. G. Spaulding of Buffalo, New York,
introduced the legal tender bill. Attorney General Bates in an
informal manner gave it as his opinion that Congress had the
right to issue such bills of credit as the bill proposed and to
make them legal tender in payment of private debts. There
was lively opposition in the House Committee, in the great
newspapers and among the bankers, a delegation of whom appeared in the Capitol. The secretary of the treasury" was opposed
to the legal tender clause, but when the passage of the act was
delayed forty days and forty nights and his vaults were empty,
and his credit broken down, he at length signified to the legislature that the passage of the bill legal tender and all was "necessary." It was not until February 25, 1862 that the bill was passed
and signed by the executive. This act authorized the issue of one
hundred fifty millions of United States notes bearing no interest,
payable to bearer, in denominations not less than $5.00, receivable for all dues to the government except duties on imports, payable by government for all dues except interest on its bonds,
fundable into United States six per cent five-twenties, and to be
a legal tender for all other debts public and private within the
country.
The notes were promptly issued and gave relief, but only for
a brief season. The drain on the treasury kept on. In June of
the same year the secretary asked for more and Congress gave
him another one hundred fifty millions. In March 1863 still another batch of one hundred fifty millions was authorized and
issued. These issues were not fundable. It is not necessary to
follow the later history of these notes in detail. An act of Congress of January 14, 187511 required the treasury to provide for
the redemption of greenbacks on the first day of January 1879,
which order, as is well known, was conformed to. These notes
or their physical successors are still in circulation and being redeemable in fact, nobody desires to exchange them for bags of
lOChief Justice Chase.
1118 Stat. at L. 296.
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metallic money. It is worth -while to remember also that under
an act of Congress of May 31, 187812 these notes except in case
of mutilation can not be cancelled but must be "reissued and paid
out again and kept in circulation." This much came of the greenback craze of that period which with great emphasis and circumstance was demanding a paper circulation founded on the whole
property of the country, whatever that phrase might mean.
Nor need any account be 'taken here of large amounts of interest bearing treasury notes issued in the later years of the war
and declared to be legal tender for the face. It is the nature of
such notes if the interest be high, to be hoarded until maturity;
or if low, to be promptly presented for funding. There was wisdom enough somewhere to stop the greenback emissions at the
four hundred fifty million limit. But for a momentary panic and
a false expectation of closing the war in the summer of 1862
they would not have been resorted to. The best and richest government on earth could not check the depreciation which set in
and ran them down to two hundred eighty-five for one hundred
as compared with dollars of gold. By means of the convenient
mechanism of the national banking system authorized by act of
Congress February 20, 1863,'13 the government was enabled to
float the vast loans needed to carry on the war, thus proving that
the government could borrow money without putting it in the
power of private debtors to swindle their creditors. The greenbacks were popular; as they went down in value prices went up.
They were excellent dollars to pay old debts with. The farmers
generally paid off their mortgages and times were good in spite
of the ruin of war. The legislature had now done or permitted
to be done all those acts resulting in the emission of bills of credit
which the framers of the constitution, and two or three generations of statesmen following them believed the constitution to
forbid, or at least, not to allow. It remained for the judiciary
to sanction the acts of the legislature.
The first opportunity was presented in the case of Hepburn v.
Griswold.14 In 1860 a certain Mrs. Hepburn of Kentucky made
a promissory note for $11,000, to one Griswold. This obligation
became due five days after the passage of the legal tender bill on
the 25th of February 1862. In 1864 the payee brought suit on
the note, whereupon Mrs. Hepburn tendered the whole sum then
1220 Stat. at L. 87.
1312 Stat. at L. 665.
14(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513.
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due in legal tender notes, and paid the same into court. At nisi
prius the tender was adjudged good and the debt satisfied.
Griswold appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the cause was argued in December 1867. Upon the instance of the then attorney-general the court ordered a reargument with leave to the government to be heard. Accordingly in
December 1868 the cause was elaborately argued by Mr. B. R.
Curtis and Mr. Attorney-General Evarts in support of the legal
tender provision and by Mr. Clarkson N. Potter against it. About
the same time five other cases involving the constitutionality of
the provision were argued by thirteen distinguished lawyers. The
judgment of the court, agreed to in December 1869, was finally
delivered by Chief Justice Chase on February 7, 1870. At that
time the court consisted of eight judges and the vote on this case
stood five to three. The majority were Chase, Nelson, Grier,
Clifford and Field-the minority Swayne, Davis and Miller. The
exact point at issue was: "Are greenbacks a lawful tender in
payment of private debts contracted before and maturing after
the passage of the legal tender act?" This question the court decided in the negative. Restricted as the case technically was, the
arguments of counsel and the opinion of judges were nevertheless addressed to the merits of the general question of the constitutionality of the notes. The court decided that greenbacks were
not legal tender for pre-existing debts because they were not constitutionally legal tender for any debts at all. On both sides it
was admitted that the constitution did not specifically empower
Congress to emit bills of credit or to make them legal tender. The
question then stood, is such power to be found among these unenumerated powers "necessary and proper for carrying on" the
scheduled powers of the eighth section of art. 1 of the constitution? The majority answered, no, and supported this negative by
reference to the fact that the greenbacks possessed no advantage
by virtue of their legal tender quality over national bank notes,
fractional currency and other paper emissions of the time. "The
legal tender quality" remarked the chief justice was "only valuable for the purpose of dishonesty."' 5
The minority whose mind was expressed through Justice Miller entertained the opposite opinion-that the legal tender notes.
were a necessary and proper means to the legitimate power of
"borrowing money." After describing the financial situation of
15Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 579, 20 L. Ed. 287.
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the government at the time of the passage of the act Justice
Miller says :16
"A general collapse of credit, of payment, and of business
seemed inevitable, in which faith in the ability of the government
would have been destroyed, the rebellion would have triumphed,
the states would have been left divided, and the people impoverished. The national government would have perished, and, with it, the
constitution, which we are now called upon to construe with such
nice and critical accuracy. .

.

. The history of that gloomy time,

not readily to be forgotten by the lover of his country, will forever remain, the full, clear, and ample vindication of the exercise of this power by Congress, as its results have demonstrated
the sagacity of those who originated and carried through this
measure."
The political and economical effects of such a decision as this
in Hepburn v. Griswold 7 had they been allowed to emerge, will
account for the unusual length of deliberation after protracted
and repeated argument. They may also be held to account for
the surprising activity of the court in taking up some new cases
involving the constitutionality of the act discredited by the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold to the extent of pre-existing contracts. A few days before the delivery of that opinion Justice
Grier of the majority had resigned, Feb. 1, 1870, and a few days
after Feb. 18, 1870 Justice Strong was appointed to the vacancy.
A month later Mr. Justice Bradley was appointed as a ninth
member of the court under the authority of Congress thus enlarging the court (Mar. 21, 1870). On the last day of March, 1870,
Attorney-General Hoar moved to reopen the question decided in
Hepburn v. Griswold. The court as was expected and perhaps
in some quarters intended, consented to the reargument of the
question of constitutionality in the cases of Knox v. Lee and
Parker v. Davis already standing on its docket. 8 The hearing
was had in December, 1870. The decision was agreed to May 10,
1871, but it was not delivered until January 15, 1872. As was
expected the decision was favorable to the constitutionality of the
legal tender act. The decision of the court in the case of Hepburn
v. Griswold'9 stood superseded. The judges were divided five
against four. For constitutionality Swayne, Davis, Miller (the
three dissentients in Hepburn v. Griswold), Strong and Bradley
(the new members); in the minority remained Chase, Nelson,
' 6 Hepburn v. Griswold, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 632, 19 L. Ed. 513.
17(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513.
'sThe arguments as well as the decision and dissenting opinions are
given in 12 Wall. (U.S.) 463 to 681.
19(1869) 8 Wall, (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513.
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Clifford, and Field, who with judge Grier constituted the majority
in the same case.
The majority in the cases decided by the enlarged and amended tribunal founded their decision mainly upon the same ground
taken by the minority in Hepburn v'. Griswold. At the time and
under the emergency the legal tender provision was a necessary
and proper means to the legitimate end of supplying the absolute
necessities of the treasury. Said justice Strong in delivering the
opinion of the court :20.
"That they did work such results is not to be doubted. Something revived the drooping faith of the people, something brought
immediately to the government's aid the resources of the nation,
and something enabled the successful prosecution of the war, and
the preservation of the national life. What was it, if not the
legal tender decision ?"
Dissenting opinions were delivered by the chief justice and
by Judges Clifford and Field. The chief justice adhered to his
opinion that the legal tender provision was not a necessary or
proper means to the carrying on of the war, or to the exercise
of any express power of the government. He explained the
stress of circumstances which in 1862 had led him to express the
erroneous opinion that the legal tender provision was then
"necessary."
The opinion of Judges Clifford and Field are learned and technical historical arguments of great length to show the constitution to be what the framers supposed it to be, a grant of limited
powers, to be strictly interpreted. Both quoted Mr. Webster's
opinion that "there is no legal tender, and can be no legal tender
in this country, under the authority of this government, or any
other, but gold and silver." Judge Field claims that without the
legal tender provision the notes would have circulated equally
well. But the concurring opinion of Justice Bradley whose doctrine seems to have been too strong meat to be assimilated by the
court, is chiefly worthy of attention. He too believed that in passing the legal tender act the legislature had but exercised a just and
necessary power, "a power which, had Congress failed to exercise
it when it did, we might have had no court here to-day to consider
the question, nor a government or a country to make it important
to do so." But the learned justice was not content to rest the
issue upon the stress of war alone.
20
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"I do not say," he adds, "that it is a war power, or that it is
only to be called into exercise in time of war; for other public
exigencies may arise in the history of a nation, which may make
it expedient and imperative to exercise it."'
Leaving the ground upon which his colleagues in equal
strength were comparing their private opinions in regard to a
state of facts he boldly announced that the power he contends for
is "one of those vital and essential powers inhering in every national sovereignty and necessary to its self-preservation." The
question of exigency, he held, is for the legislature.
The court, however, had gone no further than to hold that
under the circumstances of 1862 the issue of legal tender notes
was within the constitution and consequently that the notes were
a good tender for private debts whenever contracted. There remained but one last step to be taken and that awaited the result
of another celebrated case-that of Juilliard v. Greennn!02 appealed to the Supreme Court from the state of New York and decided March 3, 1884. The question here was, are greenbacks as
redeemed and re-issued under the act of 187823 a legal tender in
payment of private debts? As a preliminary matter the court was
obliged to choose by which of the previous decisions to stand;
that of Hepburn v. Griswold24 or Parker v. Davis.2 5 By a majority of eight to one they chose to adhere to the latter, thus reaffirming the constitutionality of the United States Legal Tender
Notes. It is this branch alone of the question which is discussed
at length in the opinion of the court. The minor, but technically
real question, of this case, "whether the re-issued notes are legal
tender," seems to have been left to take care of itself.
The opinion of the court delivered by Justice Gray recites as
preliminary conclusions the following:
(1) Congress has power by specific designation to borrow
money-and incidentally to issue in appropriate form the obligations of the United States as bonds, bills, or notes.
(2) These obligations may be in form adapted to circulation.
This is admitted by the dissenting judges in the legal tender cases.
(3) Congress was lawfully empowered to charter a national
bank, and later a system of national banks. •
-'Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 567, 20 L. Ed. 287.
22(1884) 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. Ed. 204, 4 S. C. R. 122.
2320 Stat. at L. 87.

24(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513.

25(1870) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 20 L. Ed. 287.
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(4) Congress has power to provide a national currency and
to forbid the circulation of any but national money.
(5) The denial to states to emit bills, argues in the absence
of any prohibition upon Congress the right of Congress to issue
paper money. But one further question remains, can Congress
make that money a legal tender for private debts. Yes, say the
court:
"Congress has the power to issue the obligations of the United
States in such form, and to impress upon them such qualities as
26
currency ... as accord with the usage of sovereign governments.
. . . "Congress is authorized to establish a national currency,
and to make that currency lawful money
either in coin or 2paper,
7for all purposes.

There is no reference in the decision to stress of war. The
power is one belonging to sovereignty to be exercised whenever
the legislature may deem fit. With this act the revolution is complete.
The framers of the constitution meant to abolish all kinds of
paper money. They abolished no kinds. By a series of legislative
and judicial, acts it has become the right and perhaps the duty of
Congress to issue paper money. It may issue promises to pay
on the Greek Kalends and you" and I must take them for our
day's work or take nothing. Such is the supreme law of the land.
It is probably useless and impractical to lament the failure of the
constitution to protect the country against paper money. Had its
provisions been drawn with ever so great precision and fullness,
they would have been evaded in the first tight pinch for ready
money. No written language can tie up a powerful government.
There will always be lawyers who can untie or statesmen who can
cut any knot however intricate, and judges who can find pretexts,
when not precedents for practical solution.
Any nation is liable to get involved in war, and no nation will
ever be allowed by its citizens to hold in her treasury vaults a
store of ready money with which to carry on contingent campaigns. Modern wars come suddenly and with enormous expenses. It is inevitable that the borrowing power will be resorted
to; all negotiable promises to pay are in a sense money. This is
not all. Modern commerce is so immense, so universal and so
rapid that metallic money is too cumbersome. People receive it
26Juilliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U. S. 421, 447, 28 L. Ed. 204,
4 S. C. R. 122.
27Juilliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U. S. 421, 448, 28 L. Ed. 204, 4
S. C R. 122.
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with reluctance and dread to have it in possession. Paper money
of some sort we must and will have. It has been estimated that
in 1873 there were in circulation in five great countries two hundred and fifty thousand millions of dollars of paper money. In
what ways civilized nations may best provide a safe 'and convenient paper currency is now a problem of the first interestnowhere more pressing than in our own country.28
The financial revolution whose course has been traced is however, probably of minor account compared with the political consequences which may flow from the decision of the Supreme
Court. It is now the supreme law of the land that in regard to
the currency the United States government may do all those
things which accord with the usage of sovereign governments,
save those few acts expressly forbidden in the text of the constitution, and that the legislature may judge in regard to the expediency of exercising such power. In so far, the judiciary abdicates its position as a third great power, holding a check upon
the executive and legislative. The legislature has taken an immense stride in the direction prophesied by Jefferson and
Tocqueville-toward parliamentary omnipotence.
From a scientific point of view the most interesting aspect of
this matter is that which presents it as an evolution, a development in the art of government. We see how by a long series of
legislative acts followed by judicial sanctions an important portion of the constitution has been exactly faced about from the
position in which it was placed by the framers. The logic of
events has constantly been too strong for the traditions of the
fathers. The legislature obliged to act somehow have done what
they thought at the times to be necessary. The Supreme Court,
unable to decide until some aggrieved citizen after all'the law's
delay got his suit appealed to them, has been forced by the same
inexorable logic to bring forth a judicial sanction for acts long
past and done, to pronounce which unlawful would cause confusion, damage and unhappiness. One of the English lords who
stood on the scaffold of Mary Stuart said in a brutal but truthful
manner, "Now Madam, you see what you have got to do." The
Supreme Court has simply done what reasonable and practical
men had to do. On the whole our respect for the Court increases
when we find it deciding such questions rather as statesmen than
as lawyers, however much we may be amused at the argumenta-

tion more ingenious than cogent by which the judges have per2
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suaded themselves, at least, of the -consistency of that venerable
and august tribunal.
Constitutions are not all made; they grow. The splendid and
admirable document left us by the grand convention was but the
embodiment, the codification of means of government then long
ancient. In deference to the public sentiment of the day they endeavored to organize a government of unlimited vigor, within a
limited range. To this government they gave the purse and the
sword. The main frame of the constitution will probably remain
for a long time as it was put together out of the timbers remitted
to them from the old time before them. Unchanged in interior
arrangement, in external adornments and enlargements, it cannot remain. Each new generation will accommodate the fabric
to itself. This is inevitable and doubtless beneficial. It W'ould
be a simple and convenient thing if a nation could once for all
frame its fundamental law and dismiss it from their minds. This
can never be done. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. The
study therefore of constitutional law, procedure and interpretation
will always remain among the highest employment of statesmen
and should be a part of the best education. The art of free government is still young. Great inventions are needed to improve
it, but these must be adapted to the forms and principles of the
past.

